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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUBLE "D" AMUSEMENT 
COMP ANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM B. HAWKINS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10938 
This is an action for damages for breach of contract. 
Plaintiff is a corporation and plaintiff's principal busi-
ness was that of leasing and operating amusement de-
vices, vending machines, and record playing machines. 
Plaintiff claims that defendent wrongfully breached a 
music machine location contract, which contract pro-
1 
vided that a machine owned by plaintiff was to remain 
in the defendant's place of business for a period of 
five years. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
IN LOWER COURT 
The trial Court entered judgment against the de-
fendant for the amount of $1,332.75 together with in-
terest from the lst day of July, 1964, in the amount of 
$226.53. 
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
ON APPEAL 
Defendant, appellant, seeks reversal of the trial 
Court's judgment upon the question of damages, on 
the theory that the plaintiff failed to introduce compe-
tent evidence as to his damages, if any. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of renting amusement machines, operating ciga-
rette and candy vending machines, and music machines. 
Plaintiff had eighty-three machines in operation during 
the period in question (Tr. 24). 
Defendant is the owner and operator of a lounge 
known as the L-Roy Tavern and Lounge, located in 
Orem, Utah. .... 
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Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written 
agreement dated October 16, 1963, which contract was 
admitted in evidence as Exhibit A. 
The machine described in Exhibit A was placed in 
defendant's place of business, pursuant to the contract, 
in October of 1963, and it remained in the defendant's 
place of business until September of 1964. In Septem-
ber of 1964 the machine was removed from the defend-
ant's premises. 
There have been two trials in this matter. At the 
conclusion of the first trial, the Court awarded damages 
against the defendant in the amount of $560.00. A new 
trial was granted and in the second trial the Court 
awarded damages against the defendant in the amount 
of $1,332.75 together with interest. 
Defendant believes that the weight of the evidence 
on the question of breach of contract favored the defend-
ant. Since the evidence was in conflict, and there is 
competent evidence on which the Court's decision on 
that matter can be supported, defendant does not appeal 
from that finding. 
The second trial was conducted on the theory that 
the Court had already determined that defendant was 
liable for breach of contract. For that reason, the tran-
script does not reflect the evidence in full as it relates 
to the question of breach of contract. 
The record of the first hearing was not transcribed 
nor transmitted to the Court on appeal. The record on 
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this appeal does not show, but I think that respondent's 
counsel will not question the fact, that the only records 
which were kept with respect to the machine which 
operated on the defendant's premises were records show-
ing the collection of monies from the machine. 
The practice of the plaintiff was to make weekly 
collections, divide the receipts of the machine with the 
defendant, and issue a written collection report to the 
defendant showing the amount of money in the machine 
and the manner of its division. 
Aside from that record, the plaintiff did not have 
any business records which showed either the income or 
the cost of operating the particular machine in question. 
This is shown on page 8 of the Transcript by plaintiff's 
witness, Arvid Dodge, a certified public accountant and 
plaintiff's accountant: 
"Q (By Mr. Young) I don't know whether 
the Judge heard or not. You told me that you 
had no records that reflected or that related to 
this particular machine, except for those records 
which you furnished to me? 
''A That's right, which was pertaining to the 
depreciation itself. 
"Q Or to its income, isn't that right? 
"A This is right. 
"Q And you had no records that relate~ to 
expenses that related to this particular machme? 
"A That's correct. 
"Q So this is sheer guess work? 
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"A That is what the statement says. It's an 
estimated amount." 
The foregoing testimony referred to the plaintiff's 
Exhibit A-3, which was at first rejected by the Court 
but later received as evidence of loss of profits. 
The plaintiff's witnesses were its two principal 
owners, David L. Wade and J. Dwain Westphal, and 
its accountant, Arvid Dodge. 
Plaintiff's business had a net operating loss in the 
years both before and after the inception of the contract 
here sued upon (Tr. 3_3). Wade's testimony reads as 
follows: 
"Q (By Mr. Young) Now, did the plaintiff 
pay any tax to the Federal Government in any 
one of those years? 
"A You mean income tax? 
"Q No. Income tax? 
"A Because it showed a net loss. 
"Q So you had a loss in all of those years? 
"A That's right. 
"Q On the 83 machines? 
"A That's right. 
"Q Is that right? 
"A That's right." 
The plaintiff did not keep records of either receipts 
or expenses with respect to the individual 83 machines. 
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The plaintiff's witness, Wade, also testified in answer 
to plaintiff's counsel that the plaintiff had no records 
relating to the expenses of individual machines. At 
Transcript, page 28, he testified as follows: 
"Q Would the repairs and maintenance cost 
as shown on Exhibit A-3 have been different fo~ 
this machine than for other machines, in your 
ownership at that time? 
"A Yes, sir. I don't believe there is any way 
that even if you have to break them down so there 
was, let's say 25 juke boxes and 15 cigarette ma-
chines and a dozen pinball machines and you 
break it down, there is no way that you can get 
at a definite figure to go on the one machine, be-
cause when you buy one record, you buy records 
for all machines. And when we buy a part for a 
machine, we don't attribute it to any one given 
machine. So the only argument we have is if you 
use all music machines or just all machines, the 
only thing we can do is attribute all the cost of 
the machines - or of the route to these machines. 
"And I think that we are over attributing to 
this one machine, because I don't believe it would 
take the amount of maintenance and repairs and 
costs that we are attributing to it, because we had 
a lot of older machines that have taken consider· 
ably more maintenance. 
"And the depreciation is broken down definite· 
ly on the machine itself." 
The plaintiff owned three machines exactly like 
the one described in plaintiff's Exhibit A-1 and which 
is the subject of this suit (Tr. 50). Plaintiff did not 
know what happened to the machine after it was taken 
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out of the place of business (Tr. 51). Probably the 
plaintiffs were not without the services of the machine 
in question for more than three weeks. At page 52 of 
the Transcript the Court asks the witness "\IV ade the 
question: 
"Q How long were you without the services 
of the one machine? 
"A Now, of the individual machine, we were 
probably not without the services of it very long. 
But, of course, when we had it in service, we were 
having one of our machines out of service. Just 
the individual machine, I wouldn't say more than 
two or three weeks. 
"Q How long were you without the services 
of these three machines that you had like this one? 
"A Well, now, the one machine has never 
been without service, because it went into The 
"\Vilshire, and it was traded back on the next 
model that came back. 
"And the other two machines, of course, being 
that they were newer machines, we have kept 
them more or less in operation, and kept the 
older ones off from operation, because we didn't 
want them to sit in the shop. We figured the 
potential was a little better on the newer ones 
than it was on the older ones. We just thought 
that thev would do a little better, because they 
had the· thirty-three and a third and the forty-
five and you could play mixed records and things 
like' this, 'and we figured it would help to give it 
a little better chance to stay on location. So we 
moved them out and moved the other ones in." 
The record does not show what the income of the 
machines was following the date of the removal of the 
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plaintiff's machine from the defendant's premises or 
at any time other than while one machine was located 
in defendant's place of business. 
When the newer machine, which was taken from 
defendant's place of business, was put into operation, 
an older machine was taken out of operation and put 
in plaintiff's warehouse (Tr. 53). 
The nature of Dodge's testimony can be fully un-
derstood when it is known that Dodge was the account-
ant for the plaintiff and yet took as his figure in arriving 
at the loss of the plaintiff, a figure furnished to him by 
the plaintiff's counsel. 
At page 21 of the Transcipt the Court inquired 
how the plaintiff had made the determination of a loss 
of $67.50 per month of income: 
"Q (By the Court) You don't know how 
many of these are music machines and how many 
are not? 
"A Not off hand, I don't. 
"Q May I ask where you got the figures that 
were on that statement, the other one that we 
excluded? The figures to begin with, sixty-seven 
fifty per month? 
"A I believe this was the one (indicating)? 
"Q Yes. Fifty-four fifty. No, sixty-seven 
fifty per month. 
"MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I will t~ll 
you where he got that. I furnished that to hun 
because that was your computation. 
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"And our computation was $7.90. 
"And when you calculated it on the basis of 
the average, and when you made your last deci-
sion, you determined that there was an income of 
$67 .50 per month. 
"THE COURT: I wondered who had been 
reading my notes. 
''MR. HOW ARD: Well, I might as well roll 
with the punches. That is what your calculations 
were, and I read it down and figured it was 
$67.50, and that was the finding of the Court on 
that, and we calculated what the Court had 
written on that." 
The balance of the record demonstrates clearly that 
the plaintiff did not keep any records as to his expenses 
for the individual machines. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
AND OVER OBJECTION ADMITTED CON-
J E C TUR AL AND SPECULATIVE EVI-
DENCE AS TO THE LOSS OF PROFIT 
RESULTING FROM THE BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
The law respecting the degree of certainty re-
quired to establish loss of profits is stated in A.L.I. 
"Restatement of the Law of Contracts," Sec. 331. That 
section reads as follows: 
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" ( 1) Damages are recoverable for losses 
caused or for prof its and other gains prevented 
by the breach only to the extent that the evidence 
affords a sufficient basis for estimating their 
amount in money with reasonable certainty. 
" ( 2 ) Where the evidence does not afford a 
sufficient basis for a direct estimation of profits, 
but the breach is one that prevents the use and 
operation of property from which profits would 
have been made, damages may be measured by 
the rental value of the property or by interest on 
the value of the property." 
So far as we have been able to determine, there is 
no jurisdiction which disagrees with the statement of 
the law as enunciated in the Restatement. Many 
authorities in support of the Restatement's position are 
cited in 15 A. J. 550 "Damages," Sec. 149 and 150. 
Another way of stating the rule announced by the Re-
statement is that profits in order to be recoverable may 
not be uncertain, contingent, conjectural, or speculative. 
This is the law in Utah, B. T. Moran, Inc. v. First 
Security Corporation, 24 P. 2d, 384. 
It is familiar law that the testimony of a witness 
is no stronger than as shown by cross-examination. Ed-
wards v. Clark, 83 P. 2d, 1021; Oberg v. Sanders, 184 
P. 2d, 229; Porter v. Hunter, 207 Pac. 153. 
Plaintiff sought to prove his damages through 
plaintiff's Exhibits A-3 and A-4, identified by plain-
tiff's witness as the product of guess work (Tr. 8). 
This "Guess work" was not admitted by the Court 
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at the conclusion of Mr. Dodge's testimony. At page 22 
of the Transcript, the Court said. 
"THE COURT: I think they are not ready 
yet to be offered. Let's reserve a ruling on them 
for the time being, and see if you can connect 
them up with the other witnesses." 
At this juncture, if the plaintiff's evidence was 
tested by plaintiff'li witnesses' testimony on cross-exami-
nation, the evidence of a loss was "sheer guess work" 
(Tr. 6-8). 
The only evidence offered to qualify the exhibits 
following the Court's ruling that Exhibits A-3 and A-4 
were not admissible, was the testimony of Wade and 
Westphal that in their opinion the estimates of Dodge 
were correct. 
That Dodge's testimony was not based upon com-
petent evidence is further demonstrated by the manner 
in which he, Dodge, determined the estimated income 
from the machine. The following appears in the Tran-
script on pages 21-22: 
"Q (By the Court) You don't know how 
many of these are music machines and how many 
are not? 
"A Not off hand, I don't. 
"Q May I ask where you got the figures that 
were on that other statement? The other one 
that we excluded? The figures to begin with, 
sixty-seven fifty per month? 
"A I believe this was the one (indicating)? 
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"Q Yes, Fifty-four fifty. No sixty-seven 
fifty per month. ' 
"MR. HO,VARD: Your Honor, I will tell 
you where he got that. I furnished that to him 
because that was your computation. 
"And our computation was $7.90. 
"And when you calculated it on the basis of 
the average, and when you made your last deci-
sion, you determined that there was an income of 
$67 .50 per month. 
"THE COURT: I wondered who had been 
reading my notes. 
"MR. HOWARD: Well, I might as well 
roll with the punches. That is what your calcula-
tions were, and I read it down and figured it 
was $67.50, and that was the finding of the Court 
on that, and we calculated what the Court had 
written on that. 
"THE COURT: Very well. I arrived at it 
by adding everyone of the receipts you had, and 
dividing it by the number of weeks. No, by the 
number of months. I thought this looked wrong. 
Eight months." 
It thus appears that plaintiff's experts relied upon 
an income for the machine which was found by the Court 
at a prior hearing and expenses which were estimated. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES, IF RECOVER-
ABLE AT ALL, ARE FOR THE LOSS OF , 
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NET PROFITS. PLAINTIFF DID NOT 
PROVE THE LOSS OF ANY NET PROFITS. 
An action for damages for loss of prof its in order 
to be recoverable must be for the loss of net prof its. 
Authorities supporting this view are found on 28 ALR, 
page 1510. Also see John A. Lee v. Durango Music, 
a co-partnership, et al, 355 P. 2d, 1083; Groendyke 
Transport ,Inc .v. Hal Merchant, 380 P. 2d, 682; and 
B. T .Moran, Inc. v. First Security Corporation, supra. 
Plaintiff's business never did operate at a profit 
(Tr. 33). In order for the plaintiff to recover, the 
plaintiff must take one of eighty-three machines and 
establish with reasonable certainty that that particular 
machine did operate at a profit. Since the whole busi-
ness operated at a loss and there were no records for 
this individual machine, the defendant is at a loss to 
understand how there can be any recovery for loss of 
net profits. 
As stated before, plaintiff owned three machines 
which were identical. The machine in question is one 
of three. 
There is nothing in the record to show what the 
earnings of the other identical machines were. There 
is no way of knowing if they operated at a profit or loss 
except that the whole of the business operated at a loss. 
There is no evidence from which the Court could have 
concluded to what extent if any the plaintiff actually 
suffered damages. 
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The record is entirely silent with respect to the 
question of availability of locations for machines. The 
record does not _show whether the plaintiff had the 
financial ability to obtain additional machines. The only 
thing that does appear from the record is that wheu 
this new machine was moved from the defendant's place 
of business to some other place of business, an old ma-
chine was taken off location (Tr. 52). 
The proper amount of damages to be awarded in 
this ca,se would be the loss of the prof its from the old 
machine, which was taken out of service, together with 
the difference between the profits earned by the ma-
chine in question in the defendant's place of business 
and in its new location, whatever that amount might 
be. No effort was made in this case to establish such 
a figure. The Court recognized this situation when it 
stated the following (Tr. 53) : 
"Q What I am trying to get, is how long 
were you deprived of the income of all three 
machines? 
"A Well, I just couldn't answer that for any 
certainty." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that there is no 
competent evidence in the record to support the trial 
Court's finding. The evidence of plaintiff in its essenc,e 
consisted of Dodge's guess and of Wade and Westphal s 
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opinion that Dodge's guess was correct. Surely such 
evidence does not constitute a reasonably certain basis 
for establishing loss of net profits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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